Long-range ATACMS Missiles Could Rapidly Reverse The Recent Russian Gains In Ukraine

Ukraine will soon receive more long-range Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) from the U.S. after the U.S. House of Representatives passed a legislation approving more than $60 billion in aid to Ukraine on April 20.

"Today we have a result: everything has been decided in the ATACMS negotiations for Ukraine," the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said in a tweet on April 22.

Ukraine received its first batch of ATACMS in last autumn, which comprised around 20 missiles of the initial cluster variant of ATACMS, known variously as the M39 or the Block I.

The Ukrainian armed forces put these ATACMS to use for the first time in October 2023 against two Russian-occupied airfields in eastern Ukraine, destroying a large number of helicopters and other materiel, and demonstrating the truly game-changing capabilities of this weapon system.

An ATACMS missile being launched from an M270 MLRS  Source: Wikimedia

After that, Kyiv received another batch of ATACMS missiles in early April, consisting of 100 missiles according to The New York Times report on April 24, some of which were reportedly used by the Ukrainians on April 17 against Russia’s Dzhankoy air base in the northern part of Crimea.

Ukrainians appear to have used around eight ATACMS missiles in this attack according to a video released by the Ukrainian ministry of defense which seems to show seven or eight M39s flying into the night sky. Each M39 rocket is known to carry 950 grenade-sized submunitions, which means 7,600 individual explosive munitions descended upon the Russian air base.

At least four launchers belonging to the Russian S-400 long-range surface-to-air missile battery have been confirmed as destroyed as per the imagery of ground at Dzhankoy air base that surfaced later. Additionally, the Ukrainian defense ministry claimed to have destroyed the S-400’s control center and four air-defense radars as well.

It is the ability of these cluster munition-packing ATACMS to disperse submunitions over a wide area which is a real gamechanger for the Ukrainian forces, as it allows them to blanket a large area with a single ATACMS and inflict extensive damage to the Russian military in terms of personnel and military equipment located in that particular area.

Whereas previously, the Ukrainian military had to rely mostly on ‘one-for-one’ weapon systems like HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System), Storm Shadow cruise missiles, or kamikaze drones, etc, which have also proven very deadly on the battlefield but entail using separate munitions or drones for every single target like an aircraft, tank or different components of an air defense missile system.

Therefore, large scale use of ATACMS missiles by the Ukrainian armed forces can have significant operational impacts for the Russian military in Ukraine, which will be discussed later in this article after laying out the capabilities of this weapon system in detail in the following section.

Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS)

ATACMS is a Cold War-era American tactical ballistic missile which comes in multiple variants, first two of which are cluster variants, variously known as the M39 and M39A1, the Block I and IA, and the MGM-140A and B.

The M39, as stated earlier, carries 950 M74 submunitions with a range of 25-165 kilometers, while the M39A1 is loaded with M74 300 submunitions and has a range of 70-300 kilometers. The M74 submunitions are basically anti-personnel/anti-materiel (APAM) bomblets containing a spherical high-explosive blast fragmentation charge.

According to a 2002 paper from the Center for Army Lessons Learned, these M74 submunitions are filled with composition B explosive filler and are covered by a steel shell, so after impact and detonation, each bomblet breaks up into numerous high-velocity steel fragments that are effective against targets such as truck tires, missile rounds, thin-skinned vehicles, and radar antennas.

ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System) missile system  Source: US Department of Defense

They also contain incendiary material and has an antipersonnel radius of 15 meters. That said, this submunition is not effective against armored vehicles.

While the size of the area across which these M74 bomblets are dispersed depends on the height at which it is released from the missile which can altered as per the intended density dispersion, a stated typical profile for a single M-39 missile would see it disperse its submunitions across a circular area of 33,000 square meters in total.

The later variants of the ATACMS, known as the M48s and M57s, are armed with unitary warheads consisting of a single 500-pound-class (approx. 227 kg) blast fragmentation charge that can take out singular and strongly fortified targets.

The ATACMS missile can reportedly travel at a supersonic speed of Mach 3.5, making it near impossible to intercept. This means that an ATACMS strike only becomes evident after impact when the missile’s target explodes. Also, it is the massive kinetic energy that comes with this supersonic speed that enables the ATACMS to successfully destroy fortified targets.

An ATACMS missile can be fired from the M142 HIMARS or the M270 MLRS, both of which Ukraine currently possesses and is using to fire M31/M31A1 Guided MLRS (GMLRS) rockets.

These GMLRS rockets are stored in the Launch Pod Container (LPC), which contains six rockets in total. For the ATACMS missile, the HIMARS and M270 MLRS use the Enclosure Assembly Launch Pod (EALP), which houses one missile.

How Large-scale Use Of ATACMS Could Impact Russia’s War In Ukraine?

The ability to destroy several personnel or military equipment spread across an area with a single barrage, or to take out fortified high value targets with a single munition, all far behind enemy lines, with a very hard to defend against missile system, would remarkably improve Ukraine’s prospects in its conflict with Russia.

With the help of ATACMS, Ukrainian armed forces can threaten all of Russia’s logistical channels, ammo dumps, air defense systems, aviation assets inside Ukraine and even in parts of Crimea or bordering regions inside Russia.

Take for instance the Ukrainian ATACMS strike in October 2023 against two Russian airbases at Berdyansk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine, which took out several Russian helicopters, ammunition, and equipment at these bases.

As per the satellite imagery of these air bases that emerged later, at least 17 helicopters, including multiple Ka-52 Alligator attack helicopters, were probably damaged or destroyed by the ATACMS strikes. Other than that, Ukraine claimed to have destroyed a surface-to-air missile launcher, multiple vehicles and an ammunition storage site and to have damaged an airstrip.

This must have significantly lowered the number of attack helicopters available to the Russian forces in its offensive operations in the Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions. To put it in perspective, one must recall how, only months before this strike, the Russian Ka-52 attack helicopters operating from Berdyansk had proven instrumental in thwarting the Ukrainian gains during Kyiv’s counteroffensive in June 2023.

Pictures had also emerged of some unexploded submunitions on the ground at Berdyansk, which could have taken some time to safely clear before flight operations could resume at full capacity.

Unexploded ATACMS Cluster Submunition at the Berdyansk airfield  Source:Platform X

Therefore, such extensive damage to its airpower in a single barrage, could have disastrous implications for the Russian military on the battlefield.

Russia could respond to this new development by constructing hardened aircraft shelters for its aircraft but then the Ukrainian forces could use ATACMS missiles with unitary warheads or other type of stand-off weaponry already available to them such as the France/UK-supplied SCALP EG/Storm Shadow missiles to destroy these hardened shelters.

So, perhaps, the only option left with the Russian military is to pull back its various high value aviation assets to more distant airfields which would significantly limit their contribution to Russia’s war effort due to fuel and range limitations.

Following the ATACMS strike in October 2023 on Russian airfields in Luhansk and Berdyansk, there were unconfirmed Ukrainian media reports of Russia having relocated its aircraft to safer areas.

Similarly, even after the recent ATACMS strike earlier this month against Russia’s Dzhankoy air base, there were unconfirmed reports of Russia relocating its helicopters from Dzhankoi to the airbase at Kirovski in the eastern part of the Crimean Peninsula. The Dzhankoy air base has also been one of the most important military facilities for Russia’s war effort in Ukraine, serving not only as an active airbase but also as a logistics hub and repair facility.

Russian Kamov Ka-52 attack helicopter Source:  Platform X

Likewise, even the Russian fortified command and control centers as well as key logistics nodes and related infrastructure like bridges, all deep behind front lines could be taken out using ATACMS with unitary warheads, thereby enabling the Ukrainian ground troops to breach the Russian lines much easily than before.

So, the Russian military faces a real risk of losing significant ground to the Ukrainian troops in its occupied territories inside Ukraine, and that too in a very short span of time, once Kyiv steps up its ATACMS strikes on key Russian targets.  

The ATACMS missile could also spell big trouble for Russia’s long-range S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air missile systems, especially in Crimea where majority of Ukrainian operations so far have been focussed on destroying the Russian air defenses to facilitate successful attacks on targets deeper inside the peninsula, for example, the Russian Black Sea Fleet.

For instance, the cluster variants of the ATACMS missile could inflict heavy damage to several naval ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet which are said to be usually parked very close together.

The hundreds of APAM submunitions released from a single ATACMS missile could damage or destroy the various sensors and other components of these naval vessels, putting them out of action for months.

Would Ukraine Receive Enough ATACMS Missiles?

It is also important to consider the availability of these ATACMS to Ukraine. As of August 2023, the US Army reportedly had 1,486 ATACMS missiles in its arsenal, including 364 of the cluster variants that are no longer used by the US Army. However, the ATACMS with unitary warhead are still in use, and apparently, the US Army does not have enough of them at present to spare.

However, the US Army is working to field a more capable replacement, called the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), within the next two years. The US Army has already received the first batch of PrSMs in December 2023 from Lockheed Martin, which is also the producer of ATACMS missiles. Also, the service awarded the company another $219 million PrSM early operational capability contract in March.

Precision Strike Missile (PrSM)  Source: Lockheed Martin

Operational testing of the missile is expected to take place this year, with low-rate initial production, full-rate production, and initial capability testing expected to occur next year, as per the Government Accountability Office’s 2023 Weapons Systems Annual Assessment.  

A total of 110 PrSMs are expected to be procured in 2024 and 190 in 2025, according to a Inside Defense report citing the US Department of Defense (DoD) documents. So, the more PrSMs US Army procures, more ATACMS with unitary warhead it can spare for Ukraine.

Furthermore, ATACMS are still in full-rate production, with Lockheed Martin under contract to produce 500 missiles per year, according to a report by The Washington Post in July 2023, however, all of them are planned for sales to foreign countries.

The security experts in the US have suggested in the past that Washington could ask one or more of those foreign countries to delay receipt so that Ukraine could get some of these missiles, and going ahead the US Congress could even allocate funds to purchase more ATACMS for Ukraine.

China Rapidly Tightening Its Stranglehold On Russia

The war in Ukraine may soon reduce Russia’s position in the world as a mere storehouse of commodities for China. The data from Chinese customs administration show that the Russian economy is fast becoming dependent on trade with China to remain afloat.

It is well known how after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the west cut off Russia from the global financial system and stopped importing its oil and gas, thereby prompting Moscow to make some strategic adaptations, and thus finding an important ally for itself in China.

The total value of trade between Russia and China reached more than US$ 240 billion in 2023, far exceeding the target of US$200 billion set by two countries in the bilateral meetings held a year before. Most importantly, this marks a massive 64% jump in the total Russia-China trade in last two years.

Russia likes to present its growing trade with China as an evidence of an expanding strategic-partnership, and it does make sense because growth of trade between two countries leads to economic interdependence, which was lacking in the Sino-Russian alliance until recent years.  

Chinese President Xi Jinping with Russian President Vladimir Putin  Source:Wikimedia

However, upon closer examination of the trade statistics between these two countries, we find growing imbalance in this trade relationship with Chinese exports to Russia growing at a much faster rate than its imports from the latter.

For instance, the Chinese customs data for the year 2023 shows that Russian exports to China reached US$ 129.13 billion, which amounts to 13.13% increase from the previous year. Whereas, China exported US$ 110.97 billion worth of goods to Russia in 2023, which is a whopping 45.78% increase from last year.

Also, Russian goods accounted for only about 5% of China’s imports in 2023 and the share of Chinese exports destined for Russia was even lesser, merely about 3%. While Chinese goods constituted 38% of Russian imports and the share of Russian exports to China was about 30%.

This represents a continuation of the trend observed in 2022 following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, wherein China is said to have accounted for nearly 30% of Russian exports and 40% of its imports.

On the other hand, Russian goods accounted for only about 4% of China’s imports in 2022 and the Russian share of Chinese exports was even more insignificant, barely exceeding 2%.

In fact, majority of China’s exports in 2022 as well as in 2023 went to the countries with which it has very tense bilateral relationships such as the US, which has been the largest importer of Chinese goods so far, followed by, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and India, etc.

This indicates that while trade with China is critical for Russia to weather the Western sanctions and sustain its war effort in Ukraine, China has to be mindful that economic cooperation with Russia does not affect its other trade interests in the West and the Indo-Pacific which is more important for its export driven economy.

If this trend continues, Russia’s dependence on trade with China could increase to the extent that Beijing would be in a position to dominate Russian foreign and security policy. Experts contend that once Russia’s imports and exports to and from China reach 50%, it could effectively become a vassal state of the latter.

Also, China has built up a tremendous industrial capacity over the past two decades by transforming itself from a mass producer of cheap, low-end goods to the producer of sophisticated, high-tech products. Whereas, Russian economy runs mainly on the export of energy products and raw materials. All other Russian industries and services remain underdeveloped, except its armament sector.

Therefore, majority of Russian exports to China comprise crude oil, natural gas, coal, and precious metals, whereas China has been sending massive amounts of manufactured, processed, and industrial goods to Russia.

After the western manufacturers withdrew from Russia, Chinese car manufacturers, consumer-electronics producers and other manufacturing enterprises have been left with a near monopoly over the Russian market.

Chinese car brands have been outselling local Russian-made vehicles despite being relatively expensive, with prices usually ranging above 2.5 million roubles (US$ 29,950), whereas Russian cars are generally worth only up to about 1.5 million roubles (US$ 23,961). In 2023, Chinese automakers sold a total of 553,000 cars in Russia, accounting for 49% of Russian auto market.

Overall, vehicles, aircraft, ships and transport equipment constituted about 21% of total Chinese exports to Russia, and machinery, mechanical appliances, and electrical equipment accounted for about 38% of China’s exports to Russia in 2023, as per the data from Chinese customs administration.

This means that almost 60% of Chinese exports to Russia were vehicles, aircraft, ships, transport equipment and various types of industrial goods, and all of this accounted for approximately 23% of total Russian imports in 2023, up from just 8-9% in 2021.

Selling of manufactured goods contributes significantly to China’s GDP and provides high-value jobs to its economy. Going ahead, this trend is poised to widen the economic asymmetry between the two countries, as Russia will be reduced to a resource colony for China’s industrial growth and will become more reliant on Chinese technology.

Furthermore, imports from China have also been crucial to sustaining Russia’s war effort in Ukraine. For instance, a Financial Times article in January reported tenfoldincrease in imports of high-precision CNC (computer numerical control) machine tools from China to Russia since the latter’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.  

CNC machines are indispensable to defense manufacturing, as they provide consistent precision and accuracy in cutting of metals and other rigid materials required in producing complex weapon components. Some of the major Chinese companies supplying these CNC machines to Russia are reportedly linked to China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Other than that, imports of Chinese-made vehicles like trucks and buggies have reportedly enabled the Russian military in Ukraine to maintain its combat capabilities and logistical lines despite suffering heavy losses of military equipment, especially during the initial weeks of its offensive in Ukraine.

Furthermore, China has also been indirectly facilitating the import of dual-use Western-made components like semiconductor chips into Russia, thereby enabling the Russian military industry to continue producing precision-guided munitions.

As Russia’s dependence on China increases, Beijing could leverage it to obtain access to sensitive Russian military technology through joint development programs, which could bolster China’s military power and its defense industry significantly.

For instance, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy has historically been very poor in undersea warfare due to its noisy submarines, and could benefit from increased access to Russian submarine technology entailing advanced quieting technology, acoustic systems and nuclear propulsion.

Destroyer Jinan from Chinese navy (front) and cruiser Varyag from Russian navy sail in formation after a joint naval exercise, Joint Sea 2022, in the East China Sea on Dec. 27, 2022.  Source: Xinhua

Besides, the Russian defense industry is under strain due to the war in Ukraine, and is struggling to produce and sell equipment because of Western sanctions which has resulted into declining demand for Russian arms globally.

Therefore, in the long run, access to advanced Russian military technology could also put China in a position to overtake Russia in global arms trade, as it could enable the Chinese defense firms with an opportunity to seek out customers in those markets that have been dominated by Russian arms manufacturers so far.

In fact, there have already been indications of Russians accommodating China in their military research and development programs which they were reluctant to do until recently.

Shortly after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Bauman Moscow State Technical University (MSTU) signed a Memorandum of Scientific and Educational Cooperation with the Russian-Chinese university in Shenzhen, a joint venture, wherein Russia is represented by Moscow State University (MSU) and China by the Beijing Institute of Technology.

As part of the agreement, the engineering faculty of MSTU will impart training to Chinese engineers. The MSTU is said to be the best engineering university in Russia which has been deeply involved in Russian military research and development programs ranging from missile systems and tanks to surveillance technologies.

For years, the Chinese have been trying to obtain such kind of access to Russian engineering institutions, particularly the technical faculty at these institutions, similar to the access they have enjoyed at educational institutions in the US. However, the Russians weren’t playing ball until their multi-pronged offensive in Ukraine faltered.

With reduced leverage, Kremlin may have to accommodate Chinese demands in other areas of its security and foreign policy, such as, accept Chinese naval presence in the Arctic. This may seem far-fetched at present but the two countries already seem to be moving in that direction.

In March 2023, during the Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia, President Vladimir Putin announced that he is ready to create a joint Chinese-Russian working group to develop the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which runs along the Arctic coast of Russia.

This is a major turning point, given the fact that Russia until recently had been opposing Beijing’s plans to explore the Arctic region through the NSR, as some of its most sensitive and highly strategic military assets, like ballistic missile submarines, strategic test sites, missile defense systems, and advanced radar arrays, as present along this route.

Furthermore, Russia had also initially opposed China’s efforts to become an observer state of the Arctic Council but the war in Ukraine has forced Moscow to adjust to the new realities wherein the remaining members of the Arctic Council have shunned Russia and China has yet again come to its rescue by having refused to recognize the council without Russia’s participation.

Experts suggest that President Putin was hopeful of increased imports of Russian natural gas by China, while announcing the prospects of joint Sino-Russian development of NSR but Beijing is not said to have reciprocated in that regard.

The NSR is expected to become the main maritime highway connecting Asia and Europe, as it saves one to 3,000 miles over the Straits of Malacca and the Suez Canal, and while currently Russia can only maintain NSR traffic for about nine months, Moscow has stated goals to facilitate year-round access by 2024.

The development of the commercial use of NSR could increase the income for Russia from escorting ships along this route, and allow it to expand its exports of Arctic resources, however the Western sanctions now threaten these Russian ambitions.

This has created an opening for China who has its own economic and strategic interests in the Arctic, and possesses the wherewithal to fund any joint Sino-Russian development program for the NSR.

That said, Russia must exercise caution while deepening its ties with China, otherewise what seems to be a Chinese embrace at present could end up becoming a noose around its neck.